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In unsettled fields with multiple ideal-typical institutional logics, why do organizations tend to 
weaken or conform to prevalent logic order? We argue that prestige –defined as a tribute paid by 
field members to a select few with valued distinctive traits– plays a determinant role in explaining 
institutional heterodoxy (i.e., the choice to stop instantiating dominant logics or start instantiating 
less prevalent logics). In unsettled fields, prestigious organizations adopt institutional heterodoxy 
to maintain their distinctiveness because they consider logics as means rather than constraining 
ends and because awarding bodies cannot impose strict obedience rules. Controlling for 
alternative explanations, a study of 165 French industrial design agencies (1989 to 2003) provides 
evidence that prestige favors the decision to undertake heterodox choices.  This relationship is 
weakened when organizations diversify their expertise, is marginally reinforced when 
organizations have high-status clients, and is influenced by peers’ heterodox choices. We discuss 
contributions to the neo-institutional theory of organizational choices, the socio-cultural analysis 
of field’s evolution, and the strategic perspective of the firm. 
 
 





































Despite progress in the study of institutional choices, we still know relatively little about how and 
why organizations instantiate institutional logics. Institutional theory states that fields operate 
quasi-independent of the individual actors that constitute them (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; 
Bourdieu, 1977; Friedland and Alford, 1991). Hence, the field determines actors’ respective 
behaviors, which tend to become similar as fields homogenize actors via isomorphic forces and 
potent institutional logics (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). This contention has been demonstrated 
frequently in cases where actors shift from one logic to a new, dominant logic (White, 1965; 
Becker, 1974; Lounsbury, 2001, 2007; Rao, Davis,and Ward, 2001;  Rao, Monin, and Durand, 
2003; Thornton, 2002). More recently, although work on multiple logics exemplifies redirection 
of institutional research toward sources of endogenous change, logics have continued to be 
conceptualized as oppositional and tightly connected to actors and practices (Lounsbury, 2007; 
Sanders and Tuschke, 2007; Gaba and Meyer, 2008). As a result, we have a limited understanding 
of how actors shift between logics and how changes in logic dominance occur in fields.   
  Theoretically, prior research focused on the consequences of a shift in institutional logics 
in stable fields. Empirically, observations were restrained to polar logics and ignored less 
represented logics. Overall, past works identified clear incumbents who dominate the field and 
tend to impose their logic as well as fringe players who strive to differentiate themselves, attract 
audiences’ attention, and gain recognition (Leblebici et al., 1991; Zuckerman, 1999; Schneider and 
Clemens, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007).  We broaden the scope of inquiry to include unsettled fields 
where several logics exist, actors’ positions are less firmly established, and being recognized as 
distinctive is of strategic importance. In order to maintain distinction, and because there are no 
clear ends guiding the field, we argue that more prestigious firms tend to adopt nonmainstream 
logics; that is, to become more heterodox relative to what is temporarily dominant. In turn, this 
may fuel field instability. The influence of prestige is likely to vary depending on organizations’ 
expertise specialization, pressure from influential clients, and peers’ actions. This fluid but 





































present especially in cultural markets, where actors seek distinction and demarcation more so 
than in other fields.  
    We investigate these arguments within a unique empirical setting, the French industrial 
design industry, over a 14-year  period (1989-2003). Industrial design is an appropriate  area of 
investigation because it lies at the interface of cultural trends and manufacturing and evokes the 
tutelary representations of technique, aesthetics, and business (Lucie-Smith, 1983; De Noblet, 
1988; Flamand, 2006; Guillen, 2006). Our qualitative study on the historical and institutional 
roots of the French industrial design field identifies three institutional logics: modernism, 
formalism, and managerialism. Over the period of study, the three logics coexist, legitimate 
institutions such as schools and professional associations are still in their infancy, and neither 
overarching convention nor superior legitimate ends exist. In the late 1980s, modernism 
predominated in France; however, by the early 2000s, managerialism became the most popular 
logic, indicating an interesting change in institutional prevalence.  
We tracked the instantiation choices made by 165 design agencies. After controlling for 
other dimensions (e.g., size,  international reach), endogeneity issues, and alternative explanations 
(in particular, demand, imitation, and fashion effects), we tested whether and how prestige 
influences institutional heterodoxy,  that is,  an organization’s choice to abandon the prevalent logic 
or instantiate the least prevalent logic. Since past research tends to assume that institutional logics 
are imposed on organizations and to ignore that logics could also be resources chosen by 
organizations, we hope to move the institutional research agenda by arguing and documenting 
that organizations tap into different logics available to them in a structured way.  We also suggest 
new insights into how field heterogeneity is created and changes over time.  
  Our theorizing and modelling differ from prior studies  in at least four  ways: 1) our 
context is unsettled and institutionally plural; 2) we contextualize the effects of prestige –defined 
as  field members’ tribute granted to a select  few  who possess noteworthy characteristics— 





































are built on logic changes that reinforce or dampen institutional prevalence (and not on the 
adoption of a particular logic); and 4) we propose a novel operationalization of institutional 
choices (i.e., a distance-based value of institutional heterodoxy).  
 
PRESTIGE AND INSTITUTIONAL HETERODOXY 
Inspired by a conception of society as an interinstitutional system, we conceive of organizational 
fields as connected and interpenetrated by the structural, normative, and symbolic dimensions of 
broader institutional values that institutional logics capture and render available to organizations. 
Institutional logics are the socially constructed assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules that guide 
organizational actions and are characterized by organizational identity, legitimacy driver, authority 
structures, mission, focus of attention, strategy, logic of investment, governance, and economic 
orientation (Thornton, 2002; 2004). Institutional logics sculpt actors’ cognitions and structure 
actors’ choices (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 2008). Neo-institutional research shows how 
organizations position themselves vis-à-vis institutional logics, as demonstrated in organizational 
mission statements and documents produced for audiences (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; 
Thornton, Jones, and Kury, 2005).  
  We focus on endogenous sources of institutional changes, namely, not provoked by 
events external to the field. Our interest lies in explaining what drives organizations to choose to 
instantiate more or less prevalent logics in their field. Concerning the agency/structure paradox 
(Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992; Seo and Creed, 2002; Battilana, 2006), extant literature underscores 
prestige as a key positional advantage explaining why organizations decide to embrace a new logic 
or discontinue an old one. Prestige results from  a community’s acknowledgment that some states 
or characteristics are unevenly distributed among its members (Goode, 1978; Berger et al., 1998; 
Ridgeway, 1991). The community, or its representative bodies, recognize members via awards, 
prizes, or rankings to symbolize these intracommunity dissimilarities. Prestige signals that certain 





































prestigious actors (Wegener, 1992). Acknowledged standing reduces behavioral uncertainty for 
the community and explains strategic behavior as well as deviation from the norm (Podolny, 
1993; Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001; Burris, 2004). Prestige, as granted by a community to  
individual actors, endows them with certain responsibilities to orient the field’s future  via 
institutional logic instantiation (Goode, 1978; Wegener; 1992). Prestige is evoked as a driver of 
institutional choice because 1) it augments distinguished actors’ freedom to alter representations 
of what is desirable and expected within the field and 2) prestigious actors are likely to be  
imitated by peers (Goode, 1978; Rao et al., 2003).  
  Our institutional theory of heterodox logic instantiation in plural contexts complements 
prior work based on three elements. First, rather than examining whether organizations adopt 
one specific logic over another, we explain institutional heterodoxy as adopting a nonprevalent 
logic or ceasing to refer to the dominant logic. Institutional prevalence is the observed frequency 
of the actual institutional logics that are recognized and instantiated by the actors in the field. As 
do other organizations, design agencies refer to existing institutional logics in documents 
produced for their stakeholders (e.g., mission statements, publications, reports). In institutionally 
plural contexts, instantiation is no longer dichotomous (pro or con) but gradual: the adoption or 
suppression of a logic by a focal agency at t-1 can either reinforce or undermine institutional 
prevalence at t. By making an orthodox or conservative choice, the organization instantiates the 
dominant logic and/or suppresses reference to the least represented logic. For instance, 
instantiating a modernist logic when modernism is dominant and suppressing references to 
modernism when it becomes minimal reinforce established institutional prevalence. A heterodox 
choice occurs when a firm ceases instantiating the dominant logics because it reduces their 
salience in the field and/or when a firm embraces the least represented logics. 
  Second, we examine unsettled contexts where institutions are not yet fixed, norms and 
values fluctuate, and social structure is still mobile. As Swidler (1986,: 283) asserts “actions’ 





































logic predominates, there are no well-established networks of actors that canvass the field, and 
criteria to gauge quality are unclear. In such uncertain environments, prestige is critical in 
organizing the field (Goode, 1978; Wegener, 1992). Prestige, which is granted to certain members 
to orient the field, serves as an uncertain reduction mechanism (Burris, 2004). 
  Finally, we emphasize the role of prestige as a positional attribute, since it confers 
authority and discretion to act. Past research has emphasized centrality as a critical factor 
explaining institutional change. For instance, according to Leblebici et al.’s (1991) model of 
institutional change, fringe players reorganize institutionalized fields by enacting new practices. 
Peripheral actors exhibit less connection, a lower awareness of expectations, and different 
expertise than do central actors, which allows fringe actors to revolutionize a field’s taken-for-
granted logic of action. Central players tend to appropriate more valuable resources and adopt 
fringe practices, thus shifting equilibrium and institutionalizing change. Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006) propose that organizations occupying boundary-bridging and boundary-misaligning 
locations are more aware of and open to engaging in alternative logics; they have more 
opportunities, more power to resist coercive and normative counteractions, and more economic 
interest in disregarding established institutional logics. These works have uncovered the processes 
by which embeddedness is decentred and possibilities for new action arise in the context of 
competing logics. We complement these views by scrutinizing how prestige, as a tribute received 
from an unsettled field’s members, drives institutional heterodoxy, and how this relationship is 
moderated by an organization’s specialization,  clients’ demands, and peers’ prior choices. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL PLURALITY IN CONTEXT 
To characterize the available and meaningful institutional logics present in the French industrial 
design field, we conducted a series of 25 interviews in France with retired and active independent 
designers, professional association managers, governmental representatives, company designers, 





































history and art history texts (e.g., De Noblet, 1988; Flamand, 2006;  Guidot, 2000; Guillen, 2006; 
Larson, 1993; Loewy, 1995; Lucie-Smith, 1983; Smith 2005; Whitford, 1984; Woodham, 1997) 
and  found that in many countries (Finland, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United 
States), the history of art has permeated the design field and nurtured how designers identify and 
define themselves. Based on this evidence, we identified three major ideal-typical logics: 
modernism, formalism, and managerialism. Prior works have used ideal-typical definitions of 
institutional logics (Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Thornton et al., 2005). 
Ideal-types are categorization tools that reflect and theorize on reality and are “a method of 
interpretative analysis for understanding the meaning that actors invest their actions with” 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 :110). Ideal-types are not descriptive of a reality or field per se.
1  In 
our presentation of institutional logics, ideal-types are representations that associate a series of 
dimensions (the Y axis, according to Thornton and Ocasio [2008]) that convey norms, structures, 
and symbols proper to a higher-order institutional reality with an institutional logic (the X 
dimension).  
  Briefly stated, as in many creative and cultural activities, the three institutional logics we 
observe at the industry level parallel higher-order institutional sectors. Flamand (2006, :14-15)  
theorizes that design emanates from higher-order social realities: exact sciences (e.g., physics, 
engineering), sciences of spirit (e.g., aesthetics, anthropology), and commercial resources (e.g., 
management, marketing). Paralleling this typology, modernism presents industrial design as 
rooted in science, engineering, and technique. Formalism, in a reaction against modernism, 
associates design with spirituality and aesthetics, while managerialism portrays design as 
possessing the traits of a market order and an exchange mode. Table 1 describes the main 
dimensions of the three ideal-types of institutional logics (Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008; Jones and Livne-Tarandach, 2008); Appendix 2 provides a richer description.  
                                                 
1 We ask readers to accept the methodological and theoretical benefits of using ideal-types as we accept their 






































Insert Table 1 about here 
  Roger Tallon, the famous French industrial designer, designed a symbol of France’s 
technical prowess: TGV, the high-speed train. For Tallon, the evolution of the train’s design 
reflects the deeper institutional evolution of the French industrial design field. In the mid-1980s, 
the train’s squared lines and its massive aspect epitomized Tallon’s engineering vision,  deeply 
anchored in technology where form follows function. In the mid-1990s, the second generation of 
TGV exhibited biological lines inspired by fast animals, as if form overshadowed function. The 
third generation of TGV, launched in 2005, introduced new colors and materials and optimized 
space, at minimum cost, reflecting the fashion creator Lacroix’s touch. Thus,  over its history, 
TGV has  epitomized the three ideal-typical institutional logics, represented by the shift from a 
logic rooted in technique to one where form took precedence  and, eventually, to a third where 
cost efficiency was quintessential. 
  Finally, to test for convergence and external validity of our ideal-types, we conducted a 
confirmatory series of 13 interviews in Montreal (see Appendix 1). The influence of the Montreal 
Biennial (established in 1984) and the Business Design Competition (organized in 1995) have 
placed Montreal at the forefront of avant-garde design. As a result, in 2006, Montreal  was 
recognized as “Unesco city of design.”   Ideally geographically and culturally located for a 
confirmatory study, Montreal represents the crossroad of French and American influences. 
Relations are ongoing between the Quebec region and France. Many Montreal designers trained 
in France have worked for American and Canadian firms. Interactions with designers and 
professional associations located in Montreal have helped substantiate and reinforce the industrial 
design field, both in Paris (culminating in 2006 with a cooperative agreement between the two 
capitals reinforcing cultural exchanges in art and design) and in the design-active Rhone-Alpes 
region, where, since 1987, 360 conferences have taken place under the auspices of “Entretien 





































  Four additional characteristics deserve mention to describe how the French industrial 
design field has evolved during the previous decades. First, whereas industrial design was long 
essential to American manufacturers,  French firms and  economic decision  makers in the 1960s  
considered that “industrial design was for rich countries. It was not our business” (Roger Tallon, 
interview with authors, Oct. 8, 2003). Many viewed industrial design as a luxury rather than an 
investment. As a consequence, during France’s “Glorious Thirty” (1945-1975), industrial design 
was not recognized as a legitimate profession. Second, despite efforts to emphasize its 
importance  to French industry, industrial design remained confined to the artistic sphere of 
society. In the 1970s, the French Design Center (Centre de Création Industrielle)
2 was created and 
based at the Pompidou Centre in Paris as part of the Museum of Modern Art.  
Third, the impetus for the French industrial design industry originated in the 1980s. Loyal 
to a centralization policy, the newly elected president, François Mitterrand (1981-1995 ), and his  
energetic culture minister, Jack Lang (1981-1986; 1988-1993), developed and sustained the 
concept of art and design. As Jack Lang explained: “I think that the government has to set a good 
example. France must support creators and manufacturers, it has to link economic invention to 
industry” (interview with authors, Feb. 18, 2004). Hence, President Mitterrand ordered the 
renovation of the Presidence buildings and the Château de l’Elysée; he appointed Starck and 
Wilmotte as project managers. The French government also created the first schools of design, 
such as Ensci,
3 in 1982. One year later, the Agence de Promotion de la Création Industrielle
4 
(APCI) was launched jointly by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Industry.  
                                                 
2 Interestingly enough, design has long been translated as creation; only recently has the term design been accepted 
as such. François Barré, a student of the prestigious Ecole Nationale D’Administration, and François Mathey, a 
commissioner of the Museum of Decorative Arts in Paris (1955-1986), wanted to duplicate the British Design Centre 
of London, which had been operating for almost three decades. As François Barré said during our interview: “In 
1977, it was the real introduction of industrial design in France through the yearly exhibitions around the theme: 
“WHAT IS INDUSTRIAL DESIGN?”.  According to the scholar and famous historian of industrial design, Raymond 
Guidot,  “At these exhibitions, there were the French designer Roger Tallon, but also the American designer Charles 
Eames, the Italian Joe Colombo, the Dutch designer Verner Panton, and the German Fritz Eichler, himself 
responsible for design policy at Braun. All the main foreign cultural influences were present.”   
3  “Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Création Industrielle”  (National Graduate School of Industrial Design). 
4  “Agence de Promotion de la Création Industrielle”  (Bureau of Industrial Design Promotion). T o d a y ,  A P C I  i s  a  





































Fourth, in reaction to the centralized impulse of the 1980s, the Ministry of Industry, in 
1991, sponsored ten regional design centers to trigger a new dynamics (Schmitt, Dec. 15, 2003).  
Throughout the 1990s, these centers sought to sensitize and organize regional manufacturers, 
designers, and institutions. Nevertheless, most of them have since vanished, except in the Rhône-
Alpes area. There, in 1998, the Saint-Etienne municipality organized the International Design 
Biennial, an event where schools of design from all over the world exhibited the results of their 
creative explorations of human activities (sitting, sleeping, eating, driving, working, etc.).  
Moreover, in 1999, a design union, the Fédération des Designers Industriels (FEDI), was 
founded in Lyon. Fache (Sept. 3, 2003), FEDI president, defined its goal to “structure and 
organize the design profession,” due to the lack of formal rules at the national level. Today, 
deontological guidelines determine a designer’s relationship with clients and competitors. 
  Therefore, at the end of the 1980s, three distinct institutional logics coexisted in the 
French industrial design field. During the period of our study (1989-2003), the field was 
unsettled, with multiple career paths, young educational institutions, numerous legitimating and 
awarding bodies, and no dominant professional associations. In such a context, design agencies 
faced a difficult choice in declaring their adherence to one ideal-typical logic over another. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Following Swidler’s (1986) and Orlikowski’s (1992) arguments, but at a different level of 
analysis, we assume that, in contexts such as French industrial design, with no clear dominant 
institutional logic and shifting institutional prevalence, prestige order directs institutional choices. 
Because social structure is a precondition of resource selection (Bourdieu, 1977; Sewell, 1992; 
Podolny, 2005) and since, for us, institutional logics not only constrain organizations but are also 
resources that socially ordered organizations can employ, prestigious organizations sway 





































  First, prestigious agents seek to maintain distinctiveness, and awards represent a strategic 
asset to avoid conformism and ensure survivability, especially in cultural industries. Rebours (Feb, 
2004) indicates: “Awards are critical. I militate in favour of their broad recognition, they are key 
for changing things” and Rajaut (Dec, 2003) observes: “With our award, we gained legitimacy and 
can now act more freely vis-à-vis our community and our clients”.  In unsettled contexts, 
distinctiveness can be obtained by switching logics and favoring the least prevalent ones. Hence, 
to maintain distinctiveness, prestigious agencies will be more inclined and apt than non-awarded 
agencies to modify their instantiation away from conservatism.  
  Second, prestigious organizations, in general, are thought to be more likely to resist 
change if we assume that organizations select logics based on essential ends; socially advantaged 
agents protect their position and the corresponding values and ends (e.g. Leblebici et al., 1991). 
However, along with Swidler (1986: 283), who asserts that “actions’ organizing principles are 
more enduring than its ends in unsettled contexts,” we assume that, in unsettled institutionally 
plural contexts, prestigious agents are more likely to preserve their organization than the ends 
represented by ideal-typical logics. Hence, they are open to heterodox choices. Furthermore, 
prestigious agents are better positioned, informed, and capable of initiating a meaningful 
reorientation in institutional prevalence.  Many field members may expect prestigious agents to 
be “lighthouses,” as the director of the most influential regional design center explains: 
“Laureates are like lighthouses that signal the way to go for others and enable new things and 
ideas to become acceptable.” (Gabillard, July 2003). Hence, they are more likely to reorder the 
field via institutional heterodoxy than to promote a transitory and unstable status quo.  
  Finally, in general, there is a reciprocal relationship between the awarding community and 
the awardee, with both parties seeking to reinforce their respective legitimacy (Goode, 1978). 
Awarded design agencies gain prestige and, in turn, legitimize the process of award selection and 





































contexts, since competition exists in the awarding community. “An award is a professional 
distinction, an objective recognition. We put ourselves in the situation of being judged, we did 
not interact whatsoever in the designation process, and we won” (Rajaut, Dec 2003). As there are 
numerous awards and awarding bodies, an awardee is less likely to feel constrained to adhere to a 
given logic endorsed by the entire community in theory only. Moreover, dispersed awarding 
bodies lack means to enforce strict respect vis-à-vis enounced rules and criteria. Therefore, in an 
institutionally plural context, prestige may signal distinction, but not complete adherence to a 
particular set of highly recognized and fundamental principles. Our interviewees mentioned the 
importance of prestige for establishing their community as a profession, but also noted the 
relative freedom they gain instead of being constrained by tradition: “The impact of awards has 
been increasingly huge. Receiving an award is a recognition that brings you even more freedom” 
(Schmitt, Dec 2003). Therefore, for these reasons:  
H1. The more prestigious a design agency, the higher its likelihood to engage in institutional heterodoxy 
Institutional research emphasizes the internal facet of organizations as a direct and 
indirect driver of institutional change (Kraatz and Morre, 2002; Kirchner, 2002). The degree of 
activity specialization is crucial to maintain distinctiveness vis-à-vis field members. Depending on 
its range of expertise, a design agency will (or will not) remain at the edge of a given specialty. As 
Rajaut (2003) declares, “Few agencies can pride themselves on mastering both 2D and 3D design. 
Why? Because they are two different expertises, and the agency needs to get contracts for each 
activity on a regular basis. This imposes strong organization rules and overarching principles.” 
The more specialized prestigious agencies are, the easier it is for them to maintain distinctiveness 
in a given activity. Prestigious specialists are more loyal to their specialized expertise than to an 
overarching logic; to pursue distinctiveness, they tend to change their logic instantiation more 
than diversified peers. As their range of expertise broadens, prestigious agencies tend to apply the 





































become more conservative (Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et al, 2003). In such situations, ends 
become more important than means. Therefore, expertise diversity is associated with preserving 
constraining ends whereas specialization enables prestigious agencies to select various 
institutional means to maintain distinctiveness. Hence: 
H2. Expertise diversity will reduce the positive influence of organizational prestige on institutional 
 heterodoxy 
 
 The characteristics of demand greatly influence the actions available to, and taken by, 
prestigious actors (D’Aunno et al., 2000; Sauder, 2008). Prestigious organizations possess more 
resource slack, and are more open to new logics, which induce them to redefine legitimate 
institutional forms (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Prestigious design agencies obtain also 
access to higher-status clients due to the special recognition that awards grant them. Indeed, 
high-status clients seek salient features that indicate superior skills, and awards received by 
prestigious organizations signal such distinctive superiority (Goode, 1978). In unsettled contexts, 
where no single dominant logic has yet established its supremacy, client demands take on 
enhanced importance, often in the form of special requests.  Requirements of high-status clients 
are driven by a search for distinction. The more prestigious the design agencies they associate 
with, the higher will be clients’ demand for uniqueness, thus tending away from predominant 
logics (Larson, 1993). High-status clients, therefore, will encourage prestigious actors to explore 
uncharted territories. Because  means and ends are loosely aligned and awards  are not 
constraining in unsettled contexts,  demands from high-status clients will reinforce the likelihood 
of prestigious design agencies to abandon dominant logics and select less prevalent logics. Thus:  
H3. The more prestigious a design agency, and the more prestigious its clients, the more it will engage in 
 institutional  heterodoxy 
 
In cultural fields, remarkable actors trigger deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization 
processes (Rao et al., 2001, 2003; Washington and Zajac, 2005). The “Matthew effect,” which 





































prestigious actors benefit more than others, is instrumental in explaining the diffusion of first-
order changes and code violations in a two-logic context (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001; Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004; Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007). In an oppositional 
cultural context, Rao et al. (2005) have shown that institutional heterodoxy spreads via peer 
contagion. More precisely, highly recognized organizations that infringe upon domain consensus 
weaken categorical boundaries.  The borrowing of elements from a rival category by high-status 
actors triggers emulation such that the mean number of elements borrowed by others increases, 
and variance in the number of elements borrowed declines. In an unsettled industry, neither 
domain consensus violations nor ’outrages’ matter that much (Becker, 1974: 773-40), because no 
official principles, goals, or ends predominate the field. There are only temporary prevalence 
advantages for given categories, with one logic more instantiated than another. Hence, when 
prestigious peers opt for a heterodox choice, weakening the temporary consensus, this entices a 
focal prestigious agency to behave accordingly, i.e., to weaken institutional prevalence. Emulation 
and search for distinctiveness will prompt agencies to modify how they instantiate logics. In the 
case of polar logics, one can predict whether novelty or tradition will prevail by gauging the 
decisions of prestigious peers (Rao et al., 2005; Abrahamson and Eisenman, 2008). In an 
unsettled context, we can predict that a focal prestigious agent is more likely to opt for 
institutional heterodoxy if more peers previously did so.  However, it is more difficult to predict 
which logic will be selected or discontinued by a focal actor, as institutional prevalence is not 
polarized. Overall:  
H4. The more prestigious a design agency, and the more its prestigious peers have engaged in institutional 
  heterodoxy, the more it will engage  in institutional heterodoxy 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Data source.  The interpretative analysis of our ex ante and ex post interviews, the convergence 
of our ideal-types with historical analysis of art movements, and anecdotal evidence (such as the 





































field over the period of study. In order to affirm these changes and test our propositions, we 
conducted a quantitative analysis.  The design profession is not registered with a unique SIC code 
in France. Genevieve Sengissen, member of the FEDI union, indicated that “there is no clear 
professional referential of this sort” (interview, September 3, 2003) and suggested that we use a 
professional journal: the Guide des Professionnels du Design (hereafter, the Guide). Among others, Eric 
Fache, president of FEDI, Paymal from Dragon Rouge agency, and Kaminagai, design manager 
of Parisian Metro, confirmed that this publication is the most useful source of information on 
French design. The Guide  is issued by the Strategies publishing group, which specializes in 
professional publications in the areas of communication, public relations, and art.  Founded in 
1989, it focuses on consumer goods and services industries; annual circulation is 7,000.  Since its 
origin, the Guide has used the same format for collecting information (a questionnaire sent to 
agencies) and the same categories: descriptive information, financial data, agency philosophy, 
clients, projects and products, awards, and expertise domains. Because agencies are grouped by 
their expertise, an agency can be present in more than one section of the Guide. In our dataset, we 
gathered all the information corresponding to a given agency.  Between 1989 and 2003, 249 
different agencies appeared at least once in our source.  
Institutional prevalence and dependent variables.   In our attempt to explain design agencies’ 
institutional choices, we studied institutional prevalence
5 and built our dependent variable, 
institutional heterodoxy, following a four-step process.   
  First, using the Guide, we categorized each agency’s institutional logic instantiation. As in 
prior studies (Scott et al., 2000; Rao et al., 2005; Jones and Livne-Tarandach, 2008), we composed 
a corpus of vocabulary proper to each ideal-type, based on the content analysis of our interviews 
and analysis of the logics by other scholars (De Noblet, 1988; Borja de Motoza, 2002)  (see 
                                                 
5 Institutional prevalence is measured by an agency’s expression of logic. Another interpretation, based on taken-for-
grantedness, argues that because institutions are pervasive and taken-for-granted, they are not evoked by actors In 
our context, however, where agencies must express their adherence to a logic, we opted for proxying institutional 





































bottom of Table 1 for illustrative excerpts). For each agency’s lines of self-presentation in the 
Guide, we searched for terms associated with each of the logics and counted each term.  If 
drawings or graphical representations accompanied the agency’s description,  we interpreted 
these images using the same series of references as indicated in Table 1. In most cases, there were 
congruent references to only one ideal-typical logic. In the absence of a clear dominance, we 
coded 1 for each of the two logics represented, resulting in an average of 22% of agency-year 
observations with combined references to two logics. In the rare cases of systematic reference to 
one logic and when only one cue belonged to another logic, we ignored the discrepant cue. We 
coded the data on agencies for each year  and assessed coding stability by verifying that the 
agencies that did not change their self-presentation from one year to the next received the same 
coding. Stability was 100%. For reliability, we used two additional independent coders, one of 
whom was a design expert (a teacher of design and art history). Interrater agreement among the 
three raters was 80% and was greater than 92% between the design expert and our own coding. 
After examining the diverging cases, we agreed on a final coding. 
  The second step consisted of estimating variations in occurrences of logics and 
determining whether there was evidence of institutional reordering, as suggested by our field 
study. Based upon the counts from step 1, we calculated w(i,j,k),; that is, the observed prevalence, w, 
of a logic (i, j, or k) in a given year, t. Figure 1a shows, at the field level, the evolution of 
prevalence of the three logics over the period of study. Observing institutional reordering at play 
over the years, we note the sustained progression of managerialism and the decline of 
modernism. Since these observations emanate from our data source, we searched for an  
independent source to evaluate institutional reordering. We collected information on the 
dissertations defended in France over the period of study via the sudoc.abes.fr website, the 
national reference for this type of data, and selected dissertations from the disciplines of art, 
applied sciences, engineering,  economics,  sociology, and management that  focused on industrial 





































our three institutional logics of design, plotted the cumulative occurrences of the different logics, 
and obtained an evolution of the field’s institutional order (see Figure 1b) that echoed that of the 
main data source, giving support to institutional reordering at the field level. 
Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here 
  In the third step, we calculated changes in institutional instantiation by creating two 
dichotomous variables, SuppDominant and AddDominated. SuppDominant takes a value of 1 when a 
design agency at year t suppresses reference to the most represented logic from t-1, and 0 
otherwise. AddDominated corresponds to an agency adding reference to the least represented 
logics in the field at t-1 (value is 1), and 0 otherwise. Over the full period, out of the 743 agency-
year observations, we observed 137 suppressions of  dominant logics and 136 additions of 
dominated logics. Heterodox choices seem to decelerate slightly at mid-period and regain original 
levels at the end (as shown in  Figure 2).  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
  In  the last step,  we examined instantiation changes using a weighted distance variable. 
One could argue that using mere logic frequency (e.g., in SuppDominant and AddDominated) does 
not adequately capture an institutional logic’s salience in the field, since characteristics of adopters 
vary (e.g., size). Therefore, adoption or abandonment of a logic by more prominent agencies may 
be more relevant than adoption by other entities, as earlier studies have shown (e.g., Greve, 
1995). We generated a weighted measure of institutional change by calculating the size-weighted 
distance between an agency’s position on the modernism-formalism-managerialism scale and the 
field’s barycenter. At the field level, for every year, we calculated the coordinates of the logged 
firm size-weighted instantiation of modernism, formalism, and managerialism. For instance, a 
modernist firm with twenty employees would be positioned  with the coordinates (3, 0, 0), since 
log(20)=3. For each year, we then calculated the field’s barycenter’s coordinates by averaging firm 





































To illustrate: in 1990, the field’s barycenter’s coordinates were 1.69, 0.22, and 0.74, 
indicating, for instance, that agencies adopting formalism are less numerous and smaller in size 
than their counterparts. Ten years later, the coordinates of 1.59, 0.44, and 1.36 capture the 
increased presence of managerialism  and the decline  of modernism in larger companies. For 
every year of the study, we calculated each agency’s size-weighted Mahalanobis distance from the 
barycenter and Institutional heterodoxy as the variation from one year to the next. Mahalanobis is 
preferred over Euclidian distance because  it has the advantage of utilizing group means and 
variances for each variable, taking into account the correlations of the data set; it is  not  
dependent on the scale of measurements. A reduction in distance from the center (i.e., moving 
closer to the barycenter) tends to reinforce institutional prevalence, while a positive change in 
distance (moving away from the barycenter) represents institutional heterodoxy. This indicator, 
Institutional heterodoxy, with negative and positive values, is therefore a continuous variable that 
captures the heterodoxy intensity of institutional change. 
Independent variable and moderators.   Our panel of interviewees helped us distinguish 
the five most prominent awarding entities and ceremonies characterizing professional recognition 
in our field of study:  (a) Janus de l’industrie, awarded by the French Design Institute, focuses  on 
technical characteristics;  (b) Oscar, awarded by journalists and professionals from client 
industries,  focuses on two-dimensional design such as graphism, packaging, etc.;  (c) Stratégies 
Prizes, organized by the Stratégies publishing  group,  encompass four categories of design: 
graphical,  product,  environmental,  and multidimensional; (d) TopCom awards, given at the 
TopCom conference, focus on communication and expression through visual design, editorial 
and graphical codes, and internet websites; and  (e) l’Observeur, awarded by the APCI  to 
recognize innovative products, with criteria including ergonomics, sensorial approach, and 
ecological aspects.  In a field with various legitimating agencies and several award subcategories, 
we calculated prestige as the logged value of the cumulated number of awards received by an 





































achievements over the years. Note that our results hold when we run models with prestige 
measured as the proportion of awards garnered by an agency (i.e., the number of awards received  
relative to the total number of awards granted within the field in a given year).  
To test our hypotheses 2 to 4, we interacted Prestige with three different indicators of expertise 
diversity, client status, and peers’ actions.  
  Based on our knowledge of the industry and in agreement with our interviewees, we 
distinguished five important types of expertise:  (a) visual design (graphical, 2D); (b) product 
design (3D); (c) environmental design (spaces, architecture of interiors, furniture and other 
equipment); (d) socio-analytical design (integration of psychological, sociological, and economic 
studies); and (e) sensorial design (capturing all five senses). Based on the information provided in 
the Guide, we noted the expertise used by each agency for each year.  Expertise diversity captures a 
design agency’s fields of expertise. A low value indicates specialization whereas a higher value 
indicates greater diversity.
6 
   We assumed that client status reinforces the relationship between prestige and 
institutional heterodoxy. Client status represents the percentage of high-status companies (defined 
as being one of the 40 largest French public companies [CAC40]) for which the agency worked. 
Therefore, client status is the percentage of CAC40 companies in a firm’s client portfolio in a given 
year. 
 Past Peers’ dominant logic deletion and past Peers’ dominated logic addition variables capture the 
proportion of agencies at t-1 having opted for either choice (SuppDominant or AddDominated) and 
                                                 
6 Theoretically, whereas practice exemplifies the structuring principles of a logic (Bourdieu, 1977; Sewell, 1992; 
Orlikowski and Yates, 1995), expertise designates the technical content of a field’s activities without any pre-ascribed 
institutional values. For instance, in the culinary field, excellence in coupling wine with food is an expertise that does 
not indicate whether the actual practice is nouvelle or classical cuisine.  Hence, expertise is the recognized ability to 
execute particular activities in a professional domain. In the design industry, our respondents identified five areas of 
expertise: visual, product, environmental, socio-analytical, and sensorial. Note that they did not attach expertise to 
logics in a systematic way. For instance, Foty and Gadoury, in two separate interviews, both state that they “have the 
feeling that there is no direct connection between a product design expertise and a logic.” Some point to a closer 
association between 3D design and modernism (Lacroix, Dallaire), whereas others relate it to formalism (Starck). 






































are weighted by their logged number of awards.  
Controls. A series of control variables were included in our models to account for alternative 
explanations of institutional change. For instance, in oppositional and stable contexts, marginality 
is a critical mechanism that explains avoidance of isomorphic pressures. We measured centrality 
as the logged value of an agency’s ties with professional associations and partners (Number of ties). 
It encompasses declared ties with professional associations (e.g., FEDI), unions (primarily Union 
Française des Designers Industriels), regional groups, professional accreditations from Opdqi 
(Office professionnel de qualification des designers industriels), and foreign design associations. 
Higher values point to greater centrality.  
Next, we measured the influence of demand on institutional choices by controlling for 
client portfolio characteristics that could influence institutional heterodoxy. First, we controlled 
for the direct effect of Client status.   One can argue that the more concentrated an agency’s client 
portfolio, the greater the influence of clients on an agency’s institutional choices and the less 
varied clients’ demands, indicating a higher probability of conservatism. Client concentration is the 
Herfindhal index on the total number of industrial sectors where an agency’s clients operate, out 
of the 13 represented in the database. The greater this variable, the more concentrated an 
agency’s clients and the more orthodox the agency’s instantiation choices should be.  
A vast literature demonstrates the influence of past instantiations in explaining a focal 
agent’s logic adoption. We controlled for the direct effects of Peers’ dominant logic deletion and Peers’ 
dominated logic addition, which account for potential fashion effects prompted by trend-setters likely 
to be prestigious agents (Abrahamson and Eisenman, 2008).  Other social effects could  account  
for why agencies instantiate a dominant or dominated logic. Therefore, past Peers’ modernism 
adoption and past Peers’ managerialism adoption variables are the proportions of agencies having 
adopted either modernism or managerialism at t-1 weighted by agencies’ logged number of 





































Other controls at the field level include dummy controls for years and density (logged 
number of design agencies), which accounts for ecological aspects (the quadratic term was not 
retained in final models, as it was insignificant). At the firm level, we integrated six additional 
controls in our baseline model. First, governance represents a firm’s legal structure; it is worth 1 for 
"unlimited liability," which represents greater legal responsibility for owners than other types of 
governance, and worth 0 otherwise. As governance indicates the degree to which owners bear legal 
responsibility, one could expect that the higher this responsibility, the lower the probability to 
engage in heterodox choice. Second, age, the logged number of years since creation of the agency, 
has been shown by past research to impact firms’ strategic choices. Third, size represents the 
accumulated resources garnered by a firm and is measured by the logged number of employees.  
Larger organizations may be less likely to implement heterodox choices.  Fourth, international is a 
count variable that assesses the number of an agency’s international contracts likely to influence 
its choices relative to current institutional prevalence (we use logged number of contracts). 
Finally, two binary variables indicate whether, at t-1, the focal agency instantiated modernism or 
formalism (Modernist and Formalist  variables are 1 in these cases and 0 otherwise).  
Overall, due to the necessity of repeated observations and lagged variables, we ran our 
models using 743 fully informed observations representing 165 design agencies. Table 2 reports 
the descriptive statistics for the variables and the correlation matrix.  
---------Insert Table 2 about here-------- 
Models.  We present two series of models. First, due to the presence of within-cluster error 
misspecifications (presence of a firm   over several years), we used GLS random-effects models 
with robust standard errors to test the hypothesized effect of our variables on the value of 
Institutional heterodoxy, our continuous dependent variable. Second, we present logit models with 
SuppDominant and AddDominated institutional choices as dependent variables using robust 
standard errors and clustering on agencies. Note that event risk models on the rates at which 






































Table 3 shows GLS regressions (Models 1 to 6) using Institutional heterodoxy as the dependent 
variable and full logit models (Models 7 and 8) when SuppDominant and AddDominated occur.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Model 1 displays the control variables and Models 2 to 6 show results for addition of Prestige and 
moderators. In Hypothesis 1, we argue that higher prestige has a significant positive influence on 
institutional heterodoxy. We found the direct effect of prestige to be positive and significant 
(Models 2 to 6). Gaining prestige favors a design agency’s movement away from the field’s 
barycenter. This result lends more support for H1, which associates prestige with institutional 
heterodoxy. Note that a test for a quadratic relationship, as suggested by others (e.g., Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001), was  not significant. Using coarser dichotomous dependent variables, we see 
that prestige’s coefficient is also positive and significant on deletion of the dominant logic (Model 
7) and addition of a dominated logic (Model 8); it is slightly less significant for the latter.   
  Looking at moderators, results from Models 3 to 6 indicate an interaction effect that is 
negative and significant for expertise diversity, which supports H2. Direct effect of expertise 
diversity is not significant. Note that the same results, significant at 5% and 10%, respectively,  
occur   in logit  Models 7 and 8. This finding indicates that for nonawarded design agencies, 
expertise diversity does not directly influence institutional heterodoxy’s average probability. 
However, for awarded agencies, this latter probability depends both on prestige (positive and 
significant coefficient) and on the negative and significant interaction between expertise diversity 
and prestige.  
  Client status does not appear significant in Models 4 and 6, neither as a direct influence 
nor as moderating the prestige-heterodoxy relationship. However, in  Model 8, client status tends 
to be a predictor  of conformism (main effect);  when associated with prestige, it reinforces 
heterodoxy. Direct effect is also negative and marginally significant in Model 7; the interaction, 





































client status,  as  predicted by  H3, influences   nonawarded agencies to conform  and more 
prestigious firms to opt for more heterodox choices (only for deletion of dominant logic in 
Model 8).  
  Hypothesis 4 assumes that prior heterodox choices by prestigious peers reinforce the 
decision of awarded agencies to become heterodox. Models 5 and 6 provide contrasting evidence, 
since both interactions of Peers’ dominant logic deletion and Peers’ dominated logic addition with Prestige 
exhibit significant coefficients (at p<.10 for the former in Models 6 and 7 and p<.05 for the latter 
in Model 6 only). However, whereas interaction with past peers’ dominant logic deletion shows 
the expected sign (positive), the other interaction coefficient is negative. Hence, this indicates that 
prestigious agencies are encouraged to make institutionally heterodox choices –in particular by 
adding a dominated logic as found in Model 7– when prestigious peers abandoned the dominant 
logic in the past but are discouraged from doing so when these peers add dominated logics. 
There seems to be an asymmetry in how peers’ past choices moderate the main relationship 
between prestige and institutional heterodoxy. 
  Using Models 6 to 8 as a reference, we calculated the predicted value of Institutional 
heterodoxy in different scenarios. Table 4 shows that, depending on the context, the probability of 
engaging in heterodox instantiations varies (a proportion of 2 or 3 for minimum values and  2 to 
4 for maximum values) relative to an average scenario.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Overall, H1 receives constant support: the more prestigious an organization, the more it adds 
references to dominated logics and discontinues dominant logics. Hypothesis 2 receives support 
also, as more prestigious agencies with diversified expertise are less likely to implement heterodox 
choices. Hypothesis 3 is marginally supported: high-status clients encourage prestigious agencies 
to be more unconventional than nonawarded agencies but effects occur only in cases of 
dominant logic deletion. Eventually, as expected by Hypothesis 4, there is a peers’ choice effect 





































logics but suspicion of an opposite effect when peers added less prevalent logics.  
Other explanations and robustness checks 
Controls. Control effects enable us to assess alternative explanations of institutional heterodoxy. 
Concerning an agency’s position, centrality plays a positive role in explaining heterodoxy. Models 
in Table 3 stress the positive influence of number of ties, which conforms to a view where more 
central and connected actors can trigger institutional change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). 
Regarding the influence of demand, client status negatively impacts both binary choices (Models 
7 and 8), but in other models that use a distance-based indicator of institutional heterodoxy (1-6), 
this variable is not significant. Client concentration never significantly impacts heterodoxy. 
Looking at social influences, Peers’ managerialism adoption appears to negatively influence the 
occurrence of dominant logic deletion (Model 7 in Table 3). This results from the fact that, over 
time prestigious firms tend toward managerialism diffusion, reducing the likelihood that an 
average agency discontinues that logic when it becomes dominant. Also, density favors 
institutional heterodoxy through addition of dominated logics (in Model 8, the density coefficient 
is significant at 5%), pressuring agencies to avoid conformity; it is not significant in other models. 
At the organizational level, Age tends to reduce the probability of institutional 
heterodoxy, with older organizations being more conservative. Interestingly, working abroad 
(international variable) favors only suppression of dominant logics (Model 8). Instantiating 
modernism pushes organizations to adopt a dominated logic (Model 7), but reduces the odds of 
suppressing dominant logics (Model 8). This results from the fact that modernism was the 
dominant logic at the beginning of the observation period. Instantiating a dominant logic 
increases mathematically the probability to add dominated logics. With Institutional heterodoxy as 
the dependent variable, the coefficient for modernism is positive and significant.  
Robustsness checks. We performed a series of robustness checks to verify the results using several 
measures of prestige and expertise diversity. For the former, in addition to logged cumulated 





































cumulated awards weighted by specialization in an award category. Results were unchanged. For 
the latter, we assessed each agency’s mastery in every expertise domain. For each expertise, we 
graded mastery on a scale of 0 to 10 based on accessible information from the Guide.  Using these 
grades, we calculated expertise diversity as a weighted sum and also calculated an indicator as 1 
minus the Herfindhal index of the 5 grades. A low score indicates a high concentration of 
expertise within an area, while a high score represents greater expertise diversity. Results using 
these two variables confirm a negative interaction effect with award variables on heterodoxy. We 
also ran Mlogit models using a trichotomous dependent variable, which took a value of 1 for 
addition of the least represented logic and 2 for suppression of the most prevalent logic (and 0 
otherwise). Replicating Model 6 from Table 3 using Mlogit confirms prior results.  
  Are prestige and institutional logics related? One may expect that, depending on the logic 
epitomized, a design agency will be more or less likely to receive awards. This association may 
change over time with the spread of managerialism. Despite the fact that the correlation matrix 
does not present high correlation coefficients between prestige and modernism or formalism, we 
interacted these two variables to check their influence on institutional heterodoxy. Neither 
interaction was significant at the 5% level. For period effects, instead of using year dummies, we 
created a period variable for the years before 1995, when, according to Figure 1, managerialism 
becomes the most prevalent logic. The coefficient for this variable on institutional heterodoxy is 
negative and significant at 10%, whereas its interaction with prestige is not significant.  
  Note that expertise diversity and institutional choice may be related in other ways. For 
example, they could be codetermined by unobservable factors (e.g., expertise diversity and the error 
term of our regressions could be correlated). We tested for the presence of endogeneity, which 
could affect our results. First, we estimated an instrumental regression on expertise diversity, then 
introduced the predicted residuals, resid, into the models and recalculated the standard errors. We 
checked whether resid coefficients were significant in GLS and logit equations; none was 





































to instrument expertise diversity and then tested for a systematic difference in coefficients relative 
to the noninstrumented equation. The test proved nonsignificant. These results, therefore, 
suggest the absence of biases due to endogeneity in our models (Wooldridge, 2003).  
  The relationship between expertise diversity and institutional choice might involve two-
way causation (e.g., adopting a dominated logic could inhibit an agency from specialization).  We 
developed a three-stage model wherein an agency’s institutional position explains expertise 
diversity, which, in turn, explains a second-stage institutional choice.  We test the possibility of a 
causal chain between Institutional heterodoxy and expertise diversity using the following equations:   
Equation 1:  expertise diversity* = f t-1(Institutional heterodoxy, Prestige, Number of ties,  Client 
concentration, Client status, Density, Governance, Age, Size, International, Modernist, Managerial)  
Equation 2: Institutional heterodoxy t+1 = g t (Prestige, expertise diversity *, Prestige × expertise 
diversity * , Number of ties, Client concentration, Client status, Peers’ Modernism adoption, Peers’ 
Managerialism adoption, Peers’ Dominant logic deletion, Peers’ Dominated logic addition, Density, 
Governance, Age,  Size, International, Modernist, Managerial) 
Where f t-1 and g t are functions of variables at t-1 and t, respectively.  
  Due to the additional lag to predict expertise diversity*, 136 firms remained in the sample (a 
total of 556 observations). Results from Equation 1 show that expertise diversity is positively 
related to size, age, and density, and is negatively related to both clientstatus and a modernist 
orientation. Interestingly, the lagged value of Institutional heterodoxy   is not significant, ruling out a 
causal chain between institutional positioning and expertise diversity. Equation 2 shows a 
structure of results that match  Model 6, with the exception of Client concentration having a positive 
and significant effect on heterodoxy. Results from Equation 1 indicate that expertise diversity 
depends more on classical strategic variables than on institutional positioning. We surmise that 
had we used measures on practices as defined by socio-institutional research (Bourdieu, 1977; 
Orlikowski, 1992; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Lounsbury, 2007), we would have found a 
positive connection. To clarify this point, we ran  logit models and tested the direct relationship 
between our five expertise types and the probability of modernism, functionalism, or 





































design expertise is positively associated with formalism and socio-analytical design expertise with 
managerialism. This gives more credence to an analytical distinction between expertise and 
practice, the former being technical and quite neutral whereas the latter is imbued with 
institutional logics’ characteristics (see footnote 6).  
DISCUSSION 
This paper complements the classical endogenous change tenet that assumes that 
pioneering institutional entrepreneurs or powerful actors upend institutionalized fields by 
triggering imitations of new logics. In our conception, prestige is both a capital asset and a 
function granted by field members to certain agents, resulting from esteem and observable 
achievements. It endows recipients with responsibilities and freedom to act. In unsettled 
contexts, freedom to act supersedes strict adherence to responsibilities. More prestigious 
organizations seek to maintain distinctiveness in an uncertain world where logics and ends have 
not been fully accepted, prioritized, and valued by audiences. Loose means-ends association and 
few constraints imposed on awarded agencies give them more liberty to modify how they 
instantiate logics. Seeking to maintain distinctiveness and protect their uniqueness, prestigious 
agents weaken institutional prevalence in the field rather than stabilize it. They use institutional 
logics as resources rather than ends that direct their behavior, tapping into an institutional 
reservoir of logics based on their prevalence, thereby reinforcing or weakening institutional order.  
Certain demands of high-status clients and prior experiences of peers reinforce prestigious 
agents’ inclination to select heterodox logic instantiations, whereas a broader range of expertise 
tends to make them focus on identity and organization coherence, thereby pushing them toward 
conservatism. These results support a renewed perspective of often ignored contextual 
determinants of organizations’ institutional choices and provide interesting and complementary 
elements for the study of institutional change from three perspectives: the neo-institutional 





































Agency, structure, and institutional choice.   We respond to calls by Schneiberg and Clemens (2006), 
Lounsbury (2007), and Thornton and Ocasio (2008) to tackle the challenges of institutional 
plurality in fields by developing the notions of institutional prevalence and institutional 
heterodoxy and conservatism. Assuming that logics change at a slower pace  than do adoption 
and instantiation conducted by field members,  we consider logics as more or less prevalent 
resources. Although they constrain  the organizations that instantiate them, logics coexist in a 
field and are selected depending on an organization’s prestige and contextual factors. In the case 
of polar logics, the selection of the insurgent logic leads to an automatic loss of influence of the 
dominant logic. When institutional plurality exists, and depending on prestige,  range of expertise,  
client base, and  peers’ prior activities,  an organization has more latitude to modify its 
institutional instantiation without appearing  to be an activist or an objector. Hence, the 
respective salience of institutional logics is not independent of the organizations that adopt them. 
Uncovering the mechanisms that explain why firms discontinue logic instantiation helps us 
understand the evolution of institutional prevalence. In the particular case of institutional 
plurality, the straightjacket of institutional logics loosens a bit, allowing the inscription of logics 
within a higher-order cultural context and the increasing importance of social ordering 
mechanisms in explaining institutional change to occur concurrently.  
  Prior research has shown that prestige accounts for uneven capacities of agents to act in 
relation to their institutional environment (Goode, 1978; Ridgeway, 1991; Wegener, 1992; 
Podolny, 1993; Berger et al., 1998; Burris, 2004). In institutionally plural contexts, the rationales 
underlying why prestigious actors make unorthodox choices differ from the middle-status 
conformity argument (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001) because there is no across-the-board 
accepted logic.  In the presence of coexisting logics, prestigious organizations adopt heterodox 
logics because, relative to oppositional contexts, alignment between means and ends is looser, 
distinctiveness is rewarded, and awards signal distinction more than strict adherence to rules, 





































1992), this paper conceives of institutional choice as constrained, due both to logic-determining 
characteristics (source of authority, of identity, of mission, basis of attention, etc.) and because 
past adoptions by peers and the number of ties with field members influence heterodox choices.  
Within these constraints, the social structuration of the field influences the freedom to act 
differently (via prestige and moderating factors). Thus, agency/structure relationships are 
conducive to institutional choices that concern not only a logic’s content but its relative 
prevalence. In institutionally plural contexts, instantiation choices are driven not only by ends or 
values, but may also arise from circumstances, depending on current institutional prevalence and 
an agency’s relative prestige in the field.  
Institutional prevalence and socio-cultural changes. Few studies make the connection between higher-
order institutional sectors, institutional logics at the field level, and organizations’ instantiation 
choices (Fligstein, 1990; Haveman and Rao, 1997; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).   
When organizations make reference to or stop instantiating a given logic, it impacts the relative 
prevalence of logics in the field and of higher institutional sectors in society. Hence, by 
connecting prestige and moderators of its influence on heterodoxy, we envision culture as the 
contingent expression by organizations of higher-order institutional sectors epitomized in 
institutional logics. Prestige ascription by field members to a select few alters the social structure 
that composes the canvas of society onto which the fabric of institutions is stretched. Expertise 
diversity imposes more coherence and induces prestigious organizations to behave more 
conservatively than specialized ones. High-status clients and peers that abandon dominant logics 
reinforce prestigious organizations’ likelihood to weaken institutional prevalence. Therefore, this 
study paves the way for an analysis of socio-cultural evolution whereby organizations are the 
central conveyors and dispatchers of higher-order cultural sectors, and prestigious agents and 
prestige-granting bodies are less a source of order than of ongoing fluid equilibrium. 





































complement classical analyses that assign a prevalent role to habitus and sensemaking in 
accounting for institutional change. In particular, markets for cultural goods are systems of 
classification that agents obey and from which they receive satisfaction. “Through taste, an agent 
has what he likes because he likes what he has, that is, the properties actually given to him in the 
distributions and legitimately assigned to him in the classifications” (Bourdieu, 1984: 175). 
Bourdieu aims to  position  producers and consumers of products endowed with high symbolic 
capital (art, literature, gastronomy) in a field of forces where they compete for distinctiveness  
and exist in, and by, the differences that set them apart (Bourdieu, 1994 :69). However, he assigns 
field positions to agents that condition their judgments as homologous transpositions of both 
their respective economic and cultural capitals and their prior imprinting (habitus). Agents 
reiterate orders they epitomize. Our thesis and results suggest instead that, in unsettled contexts 
where a plurality of logics exists, prestigious agents may themselves be sources of ambiguity 
because of their very quest for a unique identity and strategic distinctiveness. As various awards 
recognize different dimensions of an agent and no clear dominant view places field members into 
established hierarchies, prestigious agents play tactically with institutional logics. Thus, 
institutional prevalence remains unstable in a nondetermined way.  Rather than creating order in 
markets, prestige-granting and prestige-receiving agents generate inconclusive judgments on 
quality and dominant logics, nurturing dissension regarding legitimate classification schemes, 
causing perplexity for field members, and irresolution for what culture means. 
Institutional choice and strategic action.  Our analysis of the sources of endogenous institutional change 
uses several measures and models that may be helpful in related works on strategic actions in 
conjunction with changing environmental contexts (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Schneiberg 
and Soule, 2005). Where multiple logics coexist and remain potent ideal-types, we calculated the 
distance between an organization’s coordinates along the n logics-space axes and the barycenter 
of the field to estimate the organization’s institutional position. With this approach, we neither 





































them, ex ante, a nominal degree of fitness, as does  most prior research. Hence, we avoid the 
traps of logical inconsistency and causal fallacy that plague many empirical works that study 
strategic actions and environmental fitness. From this standpoint, we contribute to evolutionary 
models of strategic positioning by infusing social and institutional determining characteristics, as 
evidenced previously (Durand et al. 2007; Oliver, 1997).  
  There are some limitations that require mentioning. First, we examined a cultural industry 
where ideal-typical logics may differ from a manufacturing or high-technology industry.  In 
particular, our setting involves distinctive logics unlikely to be considered salient in noncultural 
industries (e.g., spirituality as an institutional sector of importance). Second, particularism 
weakens generalizability of results, and boundary conditions proper to the particular context and 
situation must be acknowledged whenever studies use national data. Third, one may question 
whether institutional prevalence is fully captured by frequency measures, as taken-for-grantedness 
can be thought of as the ultimate, but unobservable, prevalence. We opted for a research angle 
that focused on the observable with its embedded advantages and limitations. Fourth, we 
associate institutional plurality with “unsettled settings”; as one ideal-typical logic becomes 
dominant, the field settles, and the context may revert to one of classical opposition.  Fifth, 
during our period of study, institutional logics remained stable, since they are connected with 
higher-order socio-cultural orders. As a consequence, we generally ignored the blending of logics. 
Finally, we focused primarily on institutional heterodoxy and secondarily on the content of the 
chosen logics. Although we did not examine, per se, the emergence and dominance of 
managerialism in French industrial design, our study is relevant to previous works in this area. 
Indeed, the evolution of our empirical setting marks the encroachment of market into areas more 
traditionally considered science (profession) and art (spiritual). These peculiarities only reinforce 
the need to extend our study to other unsettled or mature fields and industries and to analyze 
how prestige, expertise diversity, and other organizational and institutional factors encourage 
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Figures 1. Institutional Prevalence in French Industrial Design 
 




























































































































Table 1. Ideal-types of institutional logics in industrial design industry 
  Modernist logic  Formalist logic  Managerial logic 
Corresponding 
Institutional sector  Profession Spirituality  Market 
Source of  
identity  Designer as engineer  Designer as artist  Designer as manager 
Source of  
authority  Technique mastery  Charismatic 
leadership  
An efficient means for 
business 




Basis of attention  Individual as a user  Individual as a 
human being 
Individual as a 
consumer 














To concentrate, to 
equalize, to make conform, 
rigor, “it works”, 
coherence, expertise, 




To dream, to 
imagine, to mix, to 





design art, culture… 
To sell, to make 













































Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
   Mean  s.d.  Min  Max  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  91 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 7 1 81 92 02 1   2 2  
1 Institutional  heterodoxy  1,05 3,29 -6,26 21,71                        
2 AddDominated  0,18 0,39 0,00 1,00 0 . 0 2                       
3 SuppDominant  0,18 0,39 0,00 1,00 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 3                      
4 Prestige  0,09 0,98 -0,75 2,96 0.02 0.05 0.04                     
5  Prestige x Expertise diversity  -0,01  0,55 -7,25 5,43 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 3                    
6  Prestige x Client status  0.00  0.09 -0.50 0.57 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.74 0.09                   
7  Prestige x Peers’ dominant log deletion  0.03  0.30 -0.45 1.76 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.80 0.13 0.64                  
8  Prestige x Peers’ dominated log addition  0.01  0.17 -0.39 1.44 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.68 0.05 0.52 0.47                 
9  Number of ties  0.56  0.81 0.00 5.39 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.22 -0.04 0.14 0.17 0.18                 
10 Client  concentration  0.28 0.18 0.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12  -0.17               
11 Client  status  0.07 0.07 0.00 0.67 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08  0.03 -0.04              
12 Peers’  Modernism  adoption  0.50 1.14 0.00 9.44 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.63 0.08 0.49 0.49 0.41  0.09 -0.14 -0.04             
13  Peers’ Managerialism adoption  1.02  2.25 0.00 18.87 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.74 0.15 0.59 0.64 0.47  0.20 -0.10 -0.02 0.60            
14  Peers’ Dominant logic deletion  0.12  0.13 0.00 0.51 0.04 0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.00  -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04           
15  Peers’ Dominated logic addition  0.24  0.18 0.00 0.60 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.07 -0.17          
16 Density  1.35 0.31 0.63 1.83 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01  -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.43 0.21         
17 Governance  0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.19 0.17  0.19 0.04 -0.04 0.20 0.23 -0.02 0.04 -0.01        
18 Age  2.26 0.73 0.00 4.34 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.34 0.05 0.30 0.27 0.23  0.17 0.01 -0.07 0.21 0.31 -0.06 0.09 0.16 0.28       
19 Size  2.91 0.91 0.69 5.33 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.49 0.08 0.39 0.41 0.33  0.30 -0.19 -0.05 0.37 0.44 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.44 0.40     
20 International  0.49 1.60 0.00 14.00 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.08 0.10 0.05    
21 Modernist  0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.08 -0.22 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.04    
22 Formalist  0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.19 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.24   









































TABLE 3. Prestige impact on institutional heterodoxy 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 







Number of ties  0.618** 0.869*** 0.757*** 0.875*** 0.865*** 0.758***  0.294  0.454* 
  (.19) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.17) (.18) (.21) (.18)
Client concentration  -0.127 0.291 0.245 0.290 0.158 0.123 0.114  -0.073 
  (.6) (.63) (.61) (.63) (.61) (.59) (.68) (.66)
Client status  -1.835 -1.075 -1.061 -1.105 -1.067 -1.137  -4.811+  -4.997* 
  (1.5) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.4) (2.6) (2.0)
Peers' modernism adoption  -0.133 -0.190+ -0.172 -0.195+  -0.180+ -0.165 -0.214 -0.129 
  (.11) (.11) (.1) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.14) (.14)
Peers' managerialism adoption  0.057+  0.028 0.021 0.036 0.028 0.028  -0.188  -0.365** 
  (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.13) (.12)
Peers' dominated   0.823 0.992 0.829 1.000 1.042 0.887 1.280  -0.761 
logic adoption  (1.2) (1.2) (1.3) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (.87)
Peers' dominant   -0.149 -0.204 -0.0991 -0.193 -0.364 -0.244 -0.346  -0.767 
logic deletion  (.64) (.65) (.65) (.66) (.64) (.64) (.74) (.68)
Density  -0.216 -0.129 -0.140 -0.112 -0.114 -0.104  -0.896*  -0.442 
  (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.44) (.38)
Governance  -0.363 -0.368 -0.379 -0.376 -0.354 -0.374 0.365 -0.312 
  (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.24) (.29) (.24)
Age  -0.259+ -0.474** -0.413** -0.465** -0.452** -0.381**  -0.119  -0.054 
  (.14) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.15) (.17) (.15)
Size  -0.102 -0.227 -0.202 -0.228  -0.247+  -0.218 -0.177  0.0997 
  (.14) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.14)
International  0.0819  0.124 0.102 0.131 0.130 0.112  0.149**  0.004 
  (.08) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.05) (.06)
Modernist  0.546* 0.572** 0.586** 0.581** 0.560** 0.582** 0.735*  -1.307*** 





































   
Formalist  0.095 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.015 0.016  0.430+  -0.601** 
  (.23) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.24) (.22)
Expertise diversity  0.050 0.046 0.048 0.046 0.057 0.059  -0.047  -0.0362 
  (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.03)
   
Prestige    0.373* 0.384* 0.466*  0.400+  0.492*  0.210*  0.181* 
   (.17) (.17) (.23) (.23) (.25) (.10) (.09)
Prestige x Expertise diversity    -0.439**    -0.464**  -0.030*  -0.027+ 
   (.17) (.17) (.015) (.015)
Prestige x Client status    -1.567  -1.740  1.013  1.856* 
   (2.1) (1.8) (.90) (.81)
Prestige x Peers'     -1.962* -1.881* -0.370 -0.080 
dominated logic addition  (.95) (.96) (.26) (.23)
Prestige x Peers'     0.906 0.948+  0.365+  -0.054 
dominant logic deletion  (.59) (.57) (.20) (.57)
Constant  2.037** 2.645** 2.470** 2.585** 2.657** 2.402** -1.188  0.528 
  (.75) (.83) (.8) (.83) (.83) (.8) (.84) (.73)
--------------------  --------------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- ---------------
chi2  50.34 101.4 110.8 104.9 123.2 132.6 44.41  70.79 
 
 
Note:   Models 1 to 6 GLS random effect models with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses.  
Models 7 and 8 are logit on SuppDominant and AddDominated with robust standard errors. Year dummies not reported. 





































Table 4. Predicted probabilies of institutional heterodoxy 
 
  From Model 6: change 
in distance from 
barycenter 
 
From Model 7: 
AddDominated is 
worth 1 
From Model 8: 
SuppDominant is 
worth 1 
Average scenario  1.11  11%  18% 
Minimum scenario  -.62  3%  9% 
Maximum scenario  3.41  24%  74% 
 
Average scenario takes value at their average for all variables. 
Minimum and maximum scenarios take value at their average for all variables except for 





































APPENDIX 1. List of interviewees 
 
Name  Status Date, city
Jack Lang  Former Minister of Culture and Education.   February 18, 2004, Paris.
Françoise Jollant-Kneebone  Past director of ENSCI. October 6, 2003, Paris.





October 6, 2003, Paris.
Claude Mollard  
 
Marion Laporte 
Director at the Ministry of Education.  
In charge of introducing design into French 
primary and high schools’ curriculum.  
December 16, 2003, Paris.
Agnès Lutz  Director in charge of design at Ministry of Industry.  October 7, 2003, Paris.
Joëlle Malichaud  Director in charge of design at Ministry of Culture. October 9, 2003, Paris.
Paul Schmitt  Founder of regional design centers and CEO of 
“Le Creuset”. 
December 15, 2003, Paris.
Marie-Marguerite Gabillard  Director of design center at Rhône-Alpes (CDRA). July 8, 2003, Lyon.
Josyane Franc  Director of communication for Arts school at 
Saint-Etienne city hall.  
Januar 6, 2004, Saint-
Etienne. 
Eric Fache, Geneviève 
Sengissen, Christian Roche 
Designers and members of FEDI (professional 
union). 
September 3, 2003, Lyon.
Antoine Fenoglio  Designer and CEO of Sismo agency. February 6, 2004, Lyon.
Jean-Charles Gaté  Design journalist at  « DesignFax ». December 17, 2003, Paris.
Manfred Hubert  Independent designer.  October 23, 2003, Lyon.
Yo Kaminagai  Design manager at RATP. February 18, 2004, Paris.
Muriel Rajaut  Director of Branding and Packaging service at 
Desgrippes & Gobé agency.
December 16, 2003, Paris
Christophe Rebours  Designer and CEO of  In Process agency. February 17, 2004, 
Susrènes. 
Roger Tallon  Designer.   October 9, 2003, Paris.
Jean-Pierre Vitrac  Designer and CEO of Design Pool agency. February 16, 2004, Paris.
Raymond Guidot  Historian of design. February 16, 2004, Paris.
Jocelyn de Noblet  Historian of design. February 17, 2004, Paris
 
List of interviews of 13 Montreal design experts (April, 2005). 
Sylvie Berkovicz  Design journalist at TV5. April 19. 
Louis Brassard  Counsellor of industrial development at the Ministry of Economical 
and Regional Development. 
April 21 
(by phone). 
Marc Choko  Teacher at UQAM. April 11. 
Michel Dallaire  Designer and CEO of  Michel Dallaire Design Industriel. April 22.  
André Desrosiers  Independent designer.  April 13. 
Michel Foti  Integrated designer into Sistemalux. April 6.  
Ginette Gadoury  Director of SIDIM. April 21. 
Charles Godbout   Independent designer. April 6. 
Marie-Josée Lacroix  Commissioner of design at Montréal. April 18.
Sylvie Laniel  Design counsellor of the Ministry of Quebec local and regional affairs.  April 11.
Claude Mauffette  Designer and CEO of  ClaudeMauffette Design Industriel agency.  April 14.
Cédric Sportes  Independent designer. April 5.





































APPENDIX 2. Ideal-typical logics in French industrial design 
 
 
The International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID) defines design as “a creative 
activity whose aim is to establish the multi-faceted qualities of objects, processes, services and their 
systems in whole life-cycles. Design is the central factor of innovative humanization of 
technologies and the crucial factor of cultural and economic exchange.”  Therefore, references to 
technique, aesthetics, and business in the design field echo higher-order realities of professional 
excellence, spirituality experience, or market laws. Based on our exploratory interviews, accounts 
from the history of art and architecture, and the ex post study in Montreal, three ideal-typical 
logics appear to be recognized, accepted, understood, used, and manipulated by all the field’s 
actors: modernism, formalism, and managerialism.  
 
In design, modernist logic stems from the influential Art and Architecture German Bauhaus (1919-
1933) (Guidot, 2000). Modernism is based on rational and scientific concepts (Whitford, 1984), 
whereby “form follows function.” In architecture as well, and prior to design, the trilogy “unity, 
order, purity” are the guiding principles of modernist design (Guillen, 2006,:12), for which, 
according to Mies van der Rohe, “less is more.” Modernism defends simplicity, precision, 
regularity, and functionality, what Guillèn calls “the taylorized beauty of the mechanical.” For these 
reasons, modernism has been accused of being antitraditional, antiromantic, technique-based, and 
futurist. Above all, modernism characterizes the movement toward a rapprochement between 
architects as engineers and technicians, an elaboration of a legitimate profession, and a distancing 
from the previous model of architects and designers trained, along with painters and sculptors, as 
artists in Beaux-Art schools. The creative process strives for universality, as did Charles and Ray 
Eames with the DSS chair in 1948, or Rams and Fisher with the Braun electric razor in 1969. 
Technique and technology help advance the cause of modernist designers for whom technological 
mastery is a source of authority. Objects are simple and efficient; colors are often black and white. 
Modernists perceive the individual as a user of the object in the space they design. Technology and 
its continuously evolving capacities encourage designers to constantly draw and conceive the 
purest of shapes to capture the functional essence of the entity.  Michel Dallaire, a modernist 
industrial designer from Montreal, stresses these aspects: “I dislike superficiality. I like the truth of 
each material and of each technical process. Functionality of object is essential and inherent in the 
creative process. Result must be rigorously efficient.” Andre Desrosiers, another designer from 
Montreal, concludes: “Inhabited by the engineering aspect of their works, modernist designers 
want their creation to work.” In France, the first design professionals were engineers and architects 
who touted modernism as a natural logic.   
 
Contrary to modernism, postmodernist ideology in architecture emphasizes pure design and the 
re-establishment of an architect-as-artist identity (Larson, 1993). In her study, Larson insists on 
formalism, i.e., the identification of designers as artists rather than as producers of social reality 
inspired by science. Formalism, the second ideal-typical logic, is embedded in the artistic 
movement known as Free Forms and is a reaction to the modernist logic that arose after the Second 
World War. This movement, and protest groups such as Memphis, opposed to modernist values, 
criticized mass consumption and offered a new conception of design that promoted color, 
playfulness, optimism, and subjectivity. Formalism stems from taste judgments and societal 
definitions of spirituality, sacredness, and beauty.
7 These values are evident in one of E. Sottsass’ 
                                                 
7  While religion is recognized as a classical higher-order institution (Weber, 1978; Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Thornton, 2004), we enlarge slightly the scope of this institutional sector to include spirituality and aesthetics in its 
orbit. Indeed, without entering into a debate about how many institutional sectors or orders coexist in society, we 
place spiritual, aesthetic, and transcendental dimensions into one sector, that of spirituality. Aside from the 





































most famous works: the 1969 typewriter “Valentine,” whose bright red color contrasted with the 
usual black of office equipment. For Sottsass, industrial design is “a way of seeing life, politics, 
eroticism, food and even art.” Long before Apple computers, Valentine affirmed the beauty of a 
professional object that was also a personal object. According to the formalist ideal-type, form 
does not follow function, it precedes functionality. The source of designers’ authority is 
charismatic leadership, whereby the designer aims to “create strong signs and surprises,” according 
to Philippe Starck, a world-famous French formalist. The genius of a sculptor can be applied to 
everyday objects. In 1990, Starck designed a toothbrush for Sanofy-Synthelabo that mimicked the 
form of Brancusi’s sculpture “L’envolée de l’oiseau.”  Also in 1990, Starck designed a lemon 
squeezer (manufactured by Alessi), which looks like a sculptural giant spider and is “strange and 
singular.” Formalism has allowed designers to explore new creative directions, where the individual 
is viewed as human with phenomenological experiences of reality. Cedric Sportes, a French 
designer, has adopted a formalist conception of his design practice. He describes himself as a 
“juvenile creator.” To him, a formalist designer is strategically different from a modernist designer 
because experience and free expression precede rationality and technique. “While modernism 
applies technical criteria to judge its production, formalist work is neither right nor false. It appeals 
to subjective and emotional experiences,” explains Andre Desrosiers.  
 
The third ideal-type of designer institutional logic is managerialism. Managerialism proceeds from 
considering the market as an economic structure containing values and principles that expands its 
legitimacy to new domains (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999). As early as 1959, in its exploratory tour of the American design industry, a OECE 
investigation group concluded that a professional designer “must be 30% an engineer, 30% an 
artist, 30% a sociologist, 30% a business man and 30% a seller.” (EOCE, 1959,:41). This 
conception of industrial design as viscerally entangled with business techniques has been slow to 
permeate the French design industry. In the late 1980s, the structure of the profession around the 
educational system began (design schools and curriculum distinct from engineering or art 
education), with national and regional exhibitions on design, and the institutionalization of design 
as generating distinctiveness within markets for products and services. Although technical and 
cultural values are present in managerial design, the most influential values are economic; the 
ultimate goal appears to be the use of design as a means (to achieve greater profitability, maintain 
customers’ loyalty, etc.), and not as an end. The source of a designer’s identity hinges on being a 
manager, and the source of authority revolves around the designer’s capacity to understand clients, 
current production processes, and strategic constraints. Godbout states that, in order to conceive 
optimized solutions,  “Managerial design means a tool for business.”  Hence, the individual at the 
end of the creative process (i.e., the consumer) is considered to be the target and the basis of 
attention. Gadoury, the SIDIM
8 president, says: “Managerial design must satisfy clients’ objectives 
and needs.” Clients and their needs are thus integrated into the creative process as early as possible 





                                                                                                                                                           
[corporation], exchange [market], etc.), other metaphysical functions may have been ignored in our organizational 
studies that religion, per se, does not capture entirely. However, the sacred and the beautiful have a long common 
history, in isolation and in conjunction with professions, markets, and corporations. In this endeavor, we thus follow 
Elie Faure, Erwin Panofsky, and Harrison White by drawing broader contours for spirituality as a higher-order 
institutional sector. 
8 SIDIM = Salon International du Design d’Intérieur de Montréal. 
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